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In March 2005, riots erupted in South Korea against Japan for claiming sovereignty over two small 
uninhabitable rocky islets (0.23 km
2) which are equidistanced from South Korea and Japan.  In 
February 2005, riots did not erupt in South Korea against North Korea for announcing it has 
nuclear weapons.  How can we explain moral outrage in one case, where expected net benefit is 
miniscule, and the lack thereof in the other, where net expected benefit is huge?  The paper 
constructs a forward-looking “fight-or-fight” model.  The model, though, fails to explain moral 
outrage:  There is no morality in the model to start with.  As an alternative, the paper constructs 
two models:  “quarrel-or-reconcile” and “resist-or-submit.”  Both models incorporate the role of 
national identity.  The models succeed to explain moral outrage and the lack thereof depending on 
the context. 
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  1MORAL OUTRAGE 
 
Riots erupted in South Korea on the 18
th of March 2005.  Some rioters sliced off their fingers, while 
others set themselves on fire and one even committed suicide by jumping off a bridge.  The rioters 
vented their moral outrage at Japan, which had just claimed sovereignty over a cluster of disputed 
islets—“Dokdo” (Solitary) in Korean, “Takeshima” (Bamboo) in Japanese, and known also as 
“Liancourt” rocks.  The islets are actually two large rocks and 33 small ones.  The total area is 
about 0.23 km
2—i.e., less than one eighth of the size of Monaco. They are located 215 km from 
mainland South Korea and about the same distance from mainland Japan.  The islets had been 
under the control of South Korea since 1953.  But the issue of sovereignty was not settled, as the 
case with other islands, in the 1952 San Francisco Peace Treaty between Japan and former allied 
powers.
1  They are uninhabitable, lacking adequate soil, and have no fresh water.  The protesters, 
and the Korean press in general, were enraged by what they regarded as Japan’s infringement of 
their sovereignty—as if Japan is about to re-colonize Korea.
2   
  
How should one explain such enormous emotional/moral outburst, which can lead to war, given the 
meager expected benefit such conflict?  There are, broadly speaking, three alternative theories: 
1.  Normative (backward-looking) Theory 
2.  Standard Rationality (forward-looking) Theory 
3. Dualist  Theory 
 
1. THREE  THEORIES 
1.1  Normative (backward-looking) Theory 
The normative or backward-looking explanation can be dismissed easily and, hence, it is neglected 
in this paper.  It would argue that South Korea reacted with huge emotional outburst because of 
built-in or historical norm in its psyche as a result of anger.  The Japanese colonization of Korea 
prior to World War II was brutal by any measure [e.g., Kang, 2001].  The colonization has simply 
left a deep scar and engendered enormous anti-Japanese resentment among the people of South 
Korea.   
  
                                                  
1 See “The Territorial Dispute over Dokdo” at http://www.geocities.com/mlovmo/page4.html
2 Some Korean academics have even written book-length popular accounts of the island dispute, directed at 
Japanese audiences [e.g., Koo, 2005]. 
  2However, the pain of the Japanese occupation, as brutal as it was, cuts in both directions.  South 
Korea should be careful and not provoke Japan who can, again, attack and colonize South Korea 
in self-defense.  The past can sharpen South Korea’s desire to appease Japan to avoid a similar 
experience—as symmetrically as it can sharpen South Korea’s desire to threaten Japan.  One 
cannot determine how the past influences the future unless forward-looking calculations are 
already clear.  In fact, much of the past can be reconstructed in almost equally valid ways.  As the 
worn out cliché states, the victor writes the history of the war.  History, as far as the forward-looking 
agent is concerned, is usually reconstructed to suit the agent’s forward-looking calculation, interest.  
If so, at the most abstract level of theorizing, the appeal to the past is ultimately tautological. 
 
1.2   Standard Rationaltiy (forward-looking) Theory   
It is easy to note that South Korea expressed moral outrage because such emotion is not costly:  
There is very small risk that the outrage would provoke Japan into invading South Korea.  Japan 
simply lacks the political will to attack South Korea as it did at the turn of the 20
th Century.  Japan is 
dominated by a pacifist constitution and non-militarist political culture.  It is also restrained by the 
US.  Further, the forward-looking explanation notes that the current claims and counter-claims of 
sovereignty were revived recently because of natural gas discoveries in the area and the rising 
value of local fisheries.   
  
These two reasons actually are in synch with the second approach, viz., standard rationality 
theory.  This theory proposes that agents express emotional/moral outburst as a threat when they 
calculate that expected benefit exceeds expected cost.  In such a view, the outburst is a public 
statement that acts, to follow Jack Hirshleifer’s [1987] and Robert Frank’s [1988] analyses of the 
emotions, as precommitment or hostage offering.  Precommitment, as defined by Jon Elster 
[2000], or hostage offering, as defined by Thomas Schelling [1960] and Oliver Williamson [1983], 
involves the actual reduction of one’s budget today so that one is restricted tomorrow in 
undertaking only one course of action.  When a precommitment is undertaken, the agent is not 
allowing any room for weakness of will to dissuade him from taking tomorrow an action that differs 
from the optimal one to which the agent has declared publicly to be his obligatory commitment 
[Khalil, 2006c].  In this light, the actor who makes an “outrageous threat” cannot blink at a later 
stage of the game in order to save his skin:  The cost in terms of reputation loss would be greater 
than the cost of the war itself.   
  
Thus, in this view of the emotions, moral outrage is rational in the sense that it is forward-looking.  
The expected benefit from war exceeds any benefit gained from weakened will that recommends 
appeasement, which usually takes the form “peace.”  Accordingly, one can advance the following 
hypothesis: 
  3 
Hypothesis:  South Korea’s threat of Japan is based on the calculation that South Korea would 
still gain more in case of conflict than it would if it appeased Japan. 
  
But can this hypothesis explain the moral outrage of South Korea?  Another event, which took 
place only five weeks earlier, provides a natural experiment of the hypothesis.  On the 10
th of 
February 2005, North Korea announced that it had built nuclear weapons [Chang, 2006].  What 
was the reaction of South Korea?  The above hypothesis predicts that South Korea should express 
much greater outburst of rage than it did express towards Japan.  In contrast to a war with Japan, 
the benefit of victory over North Korea is much greater.  Also, in contrast to a war with Japan, the 
probability of victory against North Korea is certain given the alliance with the US.  So, one would 
expect greater moral outrage, i.e., an aggressive threat posture, against North Korea. 
  
To the contrary, however, there were no riots in South Korea against North Korea.  There was 
certainly no slicing of fingers and no jumping off bridges in the streets of Seoul.  
  
One should not, however, rush and dismiss the forward-looking, standard rationality hypothesis.  
The hypothesis, apparently, has overlooked the double-edged nature of threats even in a forward-
looking model.  A threat may provoke rather than intimidate the opponent.  So, South Korea maybe 
did not want to provoke North Korea, given the cost of such conflict.  That is, the agent cannot bluff 
and make non-credible threats.  The agent must be prepared for the full consequences. 
  
To clear the issue of the double-edged dynamic of threats, we need a model.  Section 2 constructs 
such a model, called “fight-or-flight.”  Section 3 shows that, still, the model fails to solve the puzzle 
of moral outrage:  The fight-or-flight model still predicts that South Korea should have expressed 
moral outrage at North Korea while it should have appeased Japan.   
 
1.3   Dualist Theory 
To solve the puzzle, Section 4 discusses the third approach, viz., dualist theory.  While it embraces 
forward-looking theory, it also embraces the “identity hypothesis.”  The hypothesis advances the 
thesis that national identity or nationalism is not a redundant variable.  One cannot fully explain 
nationalism in terms of forward-looking welfare calculation.  It is as if the agent is motivated by a 
dual self: incentives (welfare utility) and identity (symbolic utility) [Etzioni, 1986; see Khalil, 1997b, 
2000]. 
  Section 5 shows how nationalism, which bonds North Korea and South Korea, offers 
different options for South Korea—as summed up in what is named below the “quarrel-or-
reconcile” model.  If we see the two as factions that belong to the same identity, i.e., Korean 
  4nationalism, South Korea is not interested in totally defeating North Korea.  South Korea is tainted 
by its alliance with a foreign power, the US, and needs reconciliation with North Korea in order to 
redeem its nationalist credentials. 
  
In contrast, Section 6 highlights that South Koreas and Japan do not belong to the same identity.  
So, we need a different model, called “resist-or-submit,” that captures the options of South Korea 
towards Japan.  The potential suppression of Korean identity may prompt South Korea to resist, 
rather than capitulate, to what seems to be the aggressive designs of Japan.   
 
2.    FIGHT-OR-FLIGHT MODEL 
In many situations, it is better to flee than fight, as ethologists have shown in their study of fight-or-
flight behavior.
3  The decision of whether to fight or to flee may arise from dynamics described by 
catastrophe theory [e.g., Zeeman, 1992].  The expected loss of welfare as a result of war, 
instigated by threat, is a double-edged sword:  It can enhance one’s resolution to fight if the flight 
entails even greater loss. 
  
The double-edged nature of threats is captured below in a forward-looking, fight-or-flight model.  
The proposed model holds the following assumptions: 
a) Information about the benefit, cost, and probability of winning the war is perfect and 
common knowledge.
4 
b)  Information about the determination of the agent under focus to carry out the commitment is 
private to the agent. 
c)  The expression of the emotions of threat is costless. 
d)  The incentives facing the members of each warring agent—if the agent is multi-person—
are compatible, i.e., there is no free-riding problem. 
e)  There is no extra utility derived from participation in collective action. 
f)  There is no difference between the official posture of the state and the informal posture of 
the public in the form of emotions. 
                                                  
3 The fight-or-fight decision, first described in 1929 by Walter Cannon [1970], has been extensively studied 
by biologists and ethologists [e.g., Gray, 1994].  Their focus, though, is on the physiological and emotional 
systems that accompany stress and response to stress. 
4 Economists have studied the issue of imperfect information and lack of common knowledge as the main 
cause of war.  Otherwise, the parties would settle a dispute peacefully.  However, in this model, war and war 
mongering can take place even in states of perfect information and common knowledge.   
  5g) The body politic is homogenous in each camp.  That is, there are no militant- and 
conservative-leaning factions in each camp.  Such factions would have different beliefs or 
convictions about the ability of the camp as a whole in carrying out a successful war.
5 
 
Given the assumptions, a single representative agent is sufficient.  The agent’s optimum emotional 
eruption or threat (T), 
T = f [{E(B)}, {C│E(B)≥E(B)
lc}, {d(E(B))}] 
whereas E(B) expected benefit of war, E(B)
lc low critical value of E(B), C cost of war irrespective of 
who is the winner, and d is determination to act.  The cost is assumed, for simplicity, to be 
constant.  It includes the explicit cost of replacing all destroyed resources in the event of a war.  It 
also includes the opportunity cost of man-hour in fighting the war.  Meanwhile,  
E(B) = Pv Bv  + (1- Pv) Bd 
where Pv is the probability of victory, whereas Bv and Bd the benefits of victory and benefit of 
defeat, respectively.  The benefit of defeat, for simplicity, is assumed to be zero.   
  
As structured, the f(.) function defines the levels of T that are optimum given E(B), C, d, and E(B)
lc.  
Given that d (determination) is private information, the agent needs to express threat to reveal 
determination.  The threat acts as a precommitment that locks the agent on a path of no-return 
[Khalil, 2006c].  The precommitment abridges the gap that exists between the optimum decision 
and the action.  As a result of weakness of will, the agent may not act according to the optimum 
decision.  To ensure that he will, threat removes any uncertainty about the resolve or determination 
of the will.  If there is no weakness of will, there would be no need to confirm one’s optimal choice 
and, hence, there would be no need for threat.  Without weakness of will, there would be no need 
to prove the determination of will through the threat posture. 
  
The fact that d is private information, it opens the window for “bluffing”—where one agent may 
threaten opponent more than what can be sustained by the determination of will.  One example is 
Iraq’s showdown with the US consequent to its invasion of Kuwait in 1990.  Iraq took a hard public 
line, when its determination was much weaker.   
  T is positive in d, d is positive in E(B).  We can ignore C since it is constant.  In this light, as 
the expected benefit increases, the agent develops greater determination to pursue his benefit, 
which prompts him to show precommitment in the form of threat. 
  
                                                  
5 The divergence of belief concerning ability, viz., stamina and tenacity in carrying out a war entails different 
assessments of the likelihood of winning the war.  Probably, this divergence is at the root of war—rather than 
differences of information regarding the absolute costs and benefits of war. 
  6Furthermore, T is positive in E(B), it would be positive in C only if expected benefit is not below a 
low critical value E(B)
lc.  Otherwise, T would be negative in C—which entails the shift of the optimal 
threat curve given the assumption that C is a constant.  This critical feature of the model, as 
discussed below, affords the almost sudden switch of frame of mind from the fight posture to the 
flight posture. 
  
The model assumes that the second derivative of T with respect to E(B) is positive when 
E(B)>E(B)
lc and is negative otherwise.  This assumption allows us to define the maximum threat 
(T
max), i.e., attack, and the minimum threat (T
 min), i.e., surrender: 
E(B) Æ ∞               T Æ Tmax 
E(B) Æ - ∞                  T Æ T min 
 










Figure 1: Threat in Fight-or-Flight Model 
  
Figure 1 demonstrates the assumptions of the model.  The x-axis denotes the endogenous 
variable, threat, while the y-axis denotes the independent variable, expected benefit.  According to 
the optimum threat curve (T), the agent takes the following actions, 
Provocation/Fight      when     T>0 
  7Appeasement/Flight     when      T<0 
 
As E(B) declines, provocation (fight) correspondingly declines until E(B) reaches the critical value 
E(B)
lc.  At E(B)
lc, cost (C) switches from a positive to a negative value, which means we have a 
discontinuous optimum threat curve.  For some range of E(B) <E (B)
lc, the optimum threat curve 
continues to be positive, although at a much lower level.  This range involves the transition period 
of adjustment from one frame of thinking to another.  But with the further decline of E(B), the 
optimum threat curve becomes clearly negative, prompting appeasement (flight). 
  
In this fight-or-flight model, if expected benefit is greater than critical value, the cost of war would 
be positive, i.e., would bolster the fight posture.  In this case, given that expected benefit is known 
to both parties, outrage would shake down the opponent into submission and force him to flee 
without war.  In this manner, the fighting posture offers the benefits of victory without any losses.  
But if expected benefit is below the critical level, the cost of war would be negative, i.e., would 
dampen the threat posture.  It amounts to stating that the saber-rattler must be sure of victory, i.e., 
expected benefits must be high enough, before provoking the opponent. 
 
3.    THE LIMITS OF THE FIGHT-OR-FLIGHT MODEL 
Is the fight-or-flight model adequate to explain moral outrage?  Is it adequate, at least, in the case 
of South Korea’s provocation of Japan, but appeasement of North Korea?   
  
To examine this question, it is very tempting to delve into major and minor episodes of the modern 
history of the Korean peninsula [see, Kim et al., 1997; Jung, 1998; Hamm, 1999; Bleiker, 2005].  
However, to keep the examination disciplined and tractable, the facts should be selected in relation 
to the two incidences in early 2005.  These incidences reflect the moral outrage puzzle—which has 
confronted non-Korean journalists (as discussed below).  Given the fight-or-flight model, which 
elucidates the puzzle, the case below is stylized to facilitate the validation of the model. 
 
3.1   Threat against North Korea 
In case of victory against North Korea, South Korea would reap a huge benefit (BV).  It would get 
rid of the long-time threat from the North to take over the south—a threat dating to the Korean War.  
This entails, among many other things, the permanent lowering of its expenditures on defense. 
Under the assumptions of the fight-or-flight model, South Korea need not cover the cost of 
rebuilding North Korea, in the case of a South Korean victory.  At least, South Korea does not have 
to spend more resources than it already does, in the form of food and economic aid, on North 
Korea. 
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What about the probability of winning the war?  The probability of victory (PV) is almost 100% 
because the US would side with South Korea, while North Korea cannot rely on Russia or China as 
the case was during the Korean War or Cold War.   
  
Given the absolute benefits and probability of winning the war, the expected benefit of war against 
North Korea is very high, i.e., above the critical expected benefit (E(B)>E(B)
lc).   
  
What about the cost of such war?  It could be staggering given that North Korea and South Korea, 
via its alliance with the US, may use nuclear weapons.  But such a huge cost should, according the 
model, bolster, rather than dampen, the fighting posture of South Korea given that expected benefit 
far exceeds the critical level.  Even in the more likely event of non-use of nuclear weapons, the 
cost of the war can be still be staggering.  This is the case because conventional warfare can go 
on much longer than the case would be if nuclear weapons are used.  So, in either case, North 
Korea’s announcement should bolster the fighting posture of South Korea. 
  
But one may argue that North Korea knows that it will lose the war.  Thus, its announcement of 
possession of nuclear weapons falls on empty ears.  The announcement is a non-credible threat 
and, hence, drew no protests from South Korea.  To wit, North Korea is widely seen as 
unpredictable with an erratic leadership [Kihl & Kim, 2006].  So, North Korea undertakes “crazy” 
acts of posturing, viz., building nuclear weapons and announcing them—which pose no threat to 
South Korea.  It is expected, then, for South Korea to pay little attention to North Korea’s posturing.   
  
However, the idea that North Korea is a bit “crazy” cuts both ways.  As Thomas Schelling argues, 
there is rationality in an irrational strategy.  If your opponent makes a threat, and you know that he 
knows that you know that the threat is without teeth, your opponent wants to convince you 
otherwise.  One way is to act a bit crazy.  That is, even if it does not pay for the opponent to carry 
out the threat, the opponent nonetheless would carry it out.  So, South Korea should be 
apprehensive.  To be a bit crazy is similar to the precommmitment of entrusting the nuclear arsenal 
to a doomsday machine, where humans cannot reassess the situation ex post—the machine would 
trigger a war even if it is not worth it economically.  In such fashion, the one who makes threats 
precommits himself in order to convince the other that the threat would be carried out even if it 
makes no sense to do so ex post.   
  So, the fight-or-flight model predicts, given expected benefit and cost, that South Korea 
should express positive threat (provocation/fight) vis-à-vis the announcement of North Korea that it 
has nuclear weapons.  This is contrary to actual events. 
 
  93.2   Threat against Japan 
In a war against Japan, South Korea’s benefit (BV) would be meager.  South Korea would secure 
some rocky islets with rights to probable natural gas reserves and fisheries.  One might also 
speculate that South Korea is interested in staving off Japan’s ambitions that extend beyond the 
rocky islets to claim other islands.  But even if we include the other islands in the equation, still the 
benefit of victory is meager. 
  
In fact, the territorial claims of Japan are miniscule in comparison to the territorial claims of North 
Korea.  North Korea wants to annex the whole territory of South Korea, which it considers to be 
occupied by foreign troops. So, in comparison to North Korea’s ambitions, victory over Japan 
would not deliver most likely more than some rocky islets. 
  
What about the probability of winning the war?  At first look, it looks very probable that South Korea 
would prevail for two reasons.  First, China is also interested in curtailing the territorial claims of 
Japan.  Thus, Chine would ally itself with South Korea—probably in the process invoking the 
common colonial past of brutal Japanese occupation as the excuse.  Second, the US would 
restrain Japan.  Japan will not venture and colonize South Korea as it did at the turn of the 
Twentieth Century.   
  
However, these two reasons cut in the opposite direction as well.  Concerning the first reason, the 
US would encourage Japan to become more militant about what Japan sees as its rights—given 
the concern of the US about the rising power of China.  Second, Japan is a strong ally of the US.  
In fact, for the strategic interests of the US, Japan is more important than South Korea.  Given 
these two considerations, the US may even help Japan against South Korea—fully knowing that 
such help may speed the unification of North Korea and South Korea in an anti-US alliance.   
  
At best of circumstances, the US will stay neutral rather than assist South Korea in restraining 
Japan.  Given this prospect, the probability of victory (PV) of South Korea without the help of the 
US is very uncertain.  Also, once we include the variable that Japan is richer and stronger than 
South Korea, it is more likely that Japan would win a military confrontation.   
  Given the meager benefits and low probability of winning the war, the expected benefit of 




What about the cost of such war?  The cost definitely dampens, rather than bolsters, the fighting 
posture of South Korea given that the expected benefit trails far behind the critical level.  In 
addition, a war against Japan would cost a great amount of resources given that Japan is more 
  10prosperous than South Korea.  In fact, the cost of such conflict would be greater than a conflict with 
North Korea.  
  
So, the fight-or-flight model predicts, given expected benefit and cost, that South Korea should 
express negative threat (appeasement/flight) vis-à-vis the announcement of Japan that it claims 
the rocky islets.  This is contrary to actual events. 
 
3.3   Lesson Ahead 
So, given the fight-or-flight model, the moral outrage (and the lack thereof) of South Korea is a 
puzzle.  This should be expected:  The fight-or-flight model has no morality to start with.  Then, 
how could one be outraged about its violation?   
  
This does not mean that the fight-or-fight model has no uses in human affairs.  It can provide 
insight only where there are no institutions of property rights. When the institutions of property 
rights are absent, the issues of morality and outrage (the violation of morality) are totally irrelevant.  
If the parties are involved in a dynamics that is prior to civil society, i.e., there is no yet discussion 
of property rights, there would be no obligatory commitments.
6  Thus, there is no reason for one 
party to be outraged, or even insulted, when attacked.  Thus, the attack cannot incense the identity 
of the aggrieved party.  So, the fight-or-flight model suits situations of predator-prey dynamics.  
Such dynamics have characterized much of human history until the rise of some semblance of 
inter-tribal and, later, inter-national civil society constrained by institutions of property rights [Khalil, 
2006b]. 
  
So, when we have property rights, as in the South Korean case, we cannot use the cost/benefit, 
forward-looking analysis that informs the fight-or-flight model.  We need a model that includes 
property rights and demonstrates how the violation of such rights leads to incensed emotional 
outbursts, i.e., moral outrage. 
 
4.    THE IDENTITY HYPOTHESIS 
It was the non-Korean journalists who noticed the moral outrage puzzle—as if they were using a 
fight-or-flight model similar to the one presented above.  These journalists asked pointed questions 
to the protestors:  Why are you slicing your fingers off for some small specks of islets in a far-away 
                                                  
6 I use the term “obligatory commitment” to denote property rights, as opposed to the term “non-obligatory 
commitment” used to denote career goals and plans.  The latter include plans to become a singer, which 
obviously is not a recognition of the right of any self [Khalil, 1999]. 
  11sea, while you did not even move a finger in protest against nuclear weapons pointed from a 
territory adjacent to yours?  
  
The protestors, if we take their pronouncements prima facie, did not find their behavior anomalous.  
There was no shortage of answers of what seemed obvious to the South Koreans.  None of the 
answers gave any cost-benefit analysis or any evolutionary fitness argument of any kind.  Of 
course, this is expected.  When people protest, they usually marshal lofty principles in order to 
cover up pure interest calculation.  And this is exactly the point.  The pure interest calculation of the 
fight-or-flight model predicts that rioters should be venting anger at North Korea, not at Japan. 
  
The protestors explained what seemed strange to non-Koreans in the following way: “the nuclear 
threat can be handled among Koreans”; “we are all Koreans”; “Japan’s sovereignty claim over a 
Korean territory is a threat to our identity as Koreans, while North Korea’s announcement is not a 
threat to our identity”; “Japan will colonize us as Koreans.”  As put by a journalist, Park song-wu: 
For many Koreans, Japan's attempts to carry out an “ocean survey'” near waters off Dokdo, 
a group of South Korea's easternmost islets, is a reminder of imperial Japan that colonized 
the Korean Peninsula from 1910 to 1945. 
  
It is the reason why Dokdo is not just a group of rocky islets for many Koreans. Rather, 
Dokdo is considered a “holy” entity that instills in them a sense of duty to protect Korea's 
territorial sovereignty from Japan's attempts to trespass [Song-wu, 2006]. 
 
  
These comments suggest that Japan’s announcement desecrated what Koreans consider to be 
“holy.”  In contrast, North Korea’s announcement threatens, at most, the welfare of the individuals 
in South Korea:  It does not threaten the national identity of these individuals.  So, there is 
something deficient in the fight-or-flight model when it discusses moral outrage:  It neglects the 
raison d'être of moral outrage: the moral duty to defense what is holy.   
  
Maybe the identity hypothesis can explain the puzzle of moral outrage against Japan, and the lack 
of it against North Korea.  The fact that people need identity is not surprising at all for non-
economists in general.  It is actually the bread and butter of theories in sociology, psychology, 
political science, and anthropology.  In these disciplines, identity is referred to as “self-esteem,” 
“ego,” “sacred,” “duty,” “self-integrity,” “moral commitment,” and so on.  In contrast, economists 
have generally neglected identity.  This should not be surprising.  It would be redundant to include 
identity in the objective or constrain function.  If identity affords utility, it is a product like any other 
and should have been included in our calculation of expected benefit.  If identity is a resource, it is 
an input like any other input and should have been included in our calculation of cost.   
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To press the social science (other than economics) case for the recognition of identity presents a 
dilemma.  This dilemma, to clarify, is unrelated to the problem mentioned at the outset with all 
theories that stress backward-looking (i.e., “irrational”) calculations.  Namely, such  theories are 
ultimately tautological because the past is usually constructed to suit the present. 
  
Rather, the dilemma posed by the identity hypothesis arises from the fact that the social science 
case advances a notion of identity that is non-reducible to the usual benefit function and cost 
function, such as the ones which inform the fight-or-flight model.  The social science case shows 
that identity, such as tribalism and nationalism, involves a motivation that differs from the usual 
welfare calculation—and such a motivation is needed to explain moral outrage.  As such, identity is 
not simply a metric of interest [Khalil, 2000].  While economic theory regards the defense of identity 
as a defense of reputation, which in turn is explained in terms of the protection of interest in 
repeated games, the social science case regards identity as an end in itself.  This is the reason for 
calling this approach “dualist.”   
  
In fact, the dualist approach is criticized in the conclusion because, at the most abstract level of 
theorizing, it takes identity as something written in stone.  But since the analysis here is concrete, it 
is useful to do so. 
  
A few economists, to wit, found it also useful to regard identity as a variable that cannot be reduced 
to forward-looking calculation.  These few economists, who started to pay attention to the social 
science case, include George Akerlof [e.g., Akerlof & Kranton, 2005], Robert Sugden [2004], and 
Amartya Sen [1979, 1993].  Let us reconstruct the identity hypothesis in the Akerlof/Sugden model.  
Agent A tries to maximize the following objective function, 
U
A = U
A (O, L, Ic) 
s.t. O = q (t-L) 
q = q (E(R), å) 
t, å, E(R) > 0 … given data; Ic is given 
 
U
A is utility function of agent A; O and L output and leisure, respectively; Ic categorical identity, i.e., 
binary value (either A is of particular gender or nation); q productivity; t total time available; E(R) 
expected resources which can fluctuate; å ability.  The model assumes that functions are well-
behaved and definable.  In particular, U
A is positive in O, L, and Ic.  So, when Ic is suppressed or 
denied, U
A declines.   
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identity would have different ramifications, depending on the identities of the antagonists.  If the 
antagonists are bonded by the same identity, we have the options of quarrel-or-reconcile—as 
shown in Section 4.  If the antagonists belong to opposing identities, we have the options of resist-
or-submit.  Neither of theses options can be captured in the fight-or-flight model.   
 
5.   QUARREL-OR-RECONCILE MODEL 
This model involves two assumptions.  First, identity matters.  Second, identity is common between 
the warring factions.  Consequently, the options facing the faction under focus are either quarrel, 
which may lead to civil war, or reconciliation [see Bleiker, 2005]. 
 
5.1    Clarifying the Terminology 
The terms “quarrel” and “civil war” are used interchangeably.  In civil war or quarrel, the faction 
under focus aggressively tries to gain the upper hand in the body politic.  It wants to impose its 
ideology/elite on the other faction.  As such, the two competing factions still recognize their 
common identity as expressed in the authority of the king, constitution, or high priest.  In this 
sense, the quarrel, as defined here, still involves the common identity that binds the factions.   
  
Such a definition of civil war excludes sectarian conflict, where friendly relation between two 
identities is disrupted as the case with Iraq in post-US invasion in 2003.   In sectarian conflict, there 
is no common identity which each side tries to claim.  Similar to sectarian conflict, arguments or fall 
outs between two nations, business partners, or married couple need a different model where 
there is no common identity [Khalil, 2006d].  And if there is a common identity—such as Islam or 
Arabs between the two warring sects in Iraq—it is incidental.  In contrast, the common identity 
under focus here plays a role in the dynamics of threat in the quarrel-or-reconcile model. 
  
Further, as used here, the term “quarrel” or “civil war” differs from the term “revolution.”  In 
revolution, the revolting agents are challenging the identity itself as expressed in the higher 
authority and, hence, needs a different model [Khalil, 2006e].  In civil war, the two quarreling 
factions usually recognize the identity of the body politic, but try to fashion it in their image and 
interest.   
  
However, concrete cases are never clear on the difference between revolution and civil war. A 
revolution against the authority of the king, to replace it with another authority, may lead to factional 
quarrel, i.e., civil war, between the factions which used to be allies.  This is the case with the civil 
wars or quarrels which followed the modern French, Russian, Chinese and Iranian revolutions.  We 
  14do not need to digress into such concrete cases.  It suffices to state that the focus here is on the 
dispute between factions that belong to same identity, rather than the attempt to replace one 
identity by another one through revolution. 
  
And still, rebellion, which is discussed below under the “resist-or-submit model,” differs from 
revolution.  Rebellion, similar to resistance discussed in the third model below, involves the 
demand for independence from the hegemony of another body politic.  In this sense, the so-called 
“American revolution” against British colonial rule is rather a rebellion. 
 
5.2    The Issue 
If the faction under focus switches from the quarrel frame of mind to the reconciliation frame of 
mind, the faction tries instead to reach out to the other faction and come to an understanding.  The 
type of reconciliation depends, as shown in the model below, on the relative strength of the faction.  
If the expected benefit is above a critical level, the reconciliation may cede some face-saving 
measure to the almost vanquished faction.  If expected benefit is low, the reconciliation may 
involve genuine power sharing that dilutes the dominance of a single elite with its puritan ideology. 
  
The term “ideology” has a long history and has been used to denote different things [Hawkes, 
2003; Schwarzmantel, 1998].  As defined here, ideology could include nationalism and tribalism, 
but is not limited to group identity.  Every ideology usually involves two components: the “scientific” 
and the “visionary.”  The “scientific” component consists of a theory of the proper constitution that 
allocates duties and rights to the different powers in the body politics. Such a theory or perspective 
affords a particular narration of historical events in a sequence that lends strong justification to the 
elite that leads the faction.  On the other hand, the “visionary” component consists of a prediction 
of how the future will develop, which lends strong justification of the policies advocated by the elite 
of the faction. 
  
As used here, ideology within a body politic is propagated by one faction against the other to 
sustain and amass greater support and allegiance to its vision and plan of action.  Ideology, as 
such, is no substitute for national identity.  It cannot be based on ethnic, linguistic, religious, or 
geographical boundary.  Otherwise, it would jeopardize the common identity. 
  As shown next, the quarrel-or-reconcile model is partially informed by a common identity—
which differentiates it from the fight-or-flight model 
 
  155.3   A Simple Model 
The same assumptions listed in the fight-or-flight model still hold here.  So, a single representative 
agent expresses emotional eruption or threat (T), 
T = f [{E(B)}, {E(C)│E(B)≥E(B)
uc}, {IccE(B)│E(B)≥E(B)
uc}, {d(E(B))}], 
E(C) = Pv (Cw + Cv) + (1- Pv) Cw
whereas Cw cost of civil war (constant), Cv cost of victory (constant), and Icc common categorical 
identity is positive in E(B), and E(B)
uc is upper critical value of expected benefit.  T is positive in 
E(B), but negative, under some conditions, in E(C) and Icc as detailed shortly.  As in the earlier 
model, the f(.) function defines the levels of T that are optimum given E(B), E(C), and E(B)
lc.   
  
What differentiate this model from the fight-or-flight model are two central features: expected cost 
function and common categorical identity. 
  
Concerning the expected cost function, the victor has to pay not only for his cost of the war (Cw), 
but also has to pay for the cost of victory Cv.  The cost of victory consists of two accounts: the 
vanquished faction’s cost of war as well as the other faction’s difference in welfare so that it is 
equals to the victor’s.  This is the case because, in civil war, the two factions belong to the same 
body politic and, hence, the welfare of the vanquished faction is equalized with the victor in order to 
avoid another civil war.  So, in the case of losing the civil war, (1- Pv), the faction under focus 
actually does not have to pay for its cost of war (Cw).  Thus, if the faction’s expected benefit of civil 
war is low, it does not have to worry about the cost of war altogether.  So, for simplicity, E(C) =0 
when E(B)≤E(B)
uc and, hence, the optimum threat curve (T) is not discontinuous in this range of 
E(B) as in the fight-or-flight model.  But when E(B)≥E(B)
uc, E(C) = Pv (Cw + Cv), i.e., E(C) is 
positive. 
  
When E(C) is positive, T is negative in E(C)-—which discontinuously shifts the T curve to the left 
given that E(C) is a constant.  The dynamic here is that the faction that wins has to worry about 
winning.  It cannot simply collect the benefit of the civil war and walk away as in the case of war in 
the fight-or-flight model.  That is, the cost of war for the agent who has expected benefit greater 
than the critical value cannot act to bolster his threat posture.  A greater threat posture would mean 
that the victor would have to pay off the other faction.  In addition, the cost of victory also acts to 
dampen the threat posture.  A case in point is the German unification of 1990.  The West Germans 
are still reeling from the huge cost of unification.  So, as the cost of victory rises, it would dampen 
the zeal of pursuing threats (civil war) when the faction under focus seems more likely reap the 
benefit of victory. 
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play a role, i.e., it is zero, when E(B)≤E(B)
uc.  Basically the faction under focus, in its effort to 
increase its chance of winning the civil war, highlights how despicable the other faction is, 
downplaying the common identity.  However, when the faction under focus senses victory within its 
grasp, i.e., E(B)≥E(B)
uc, Icc takes a positive value.  Given that T is negative in Icc, the T curve will 
shift discontinuously further to the left.  In addition, the T curve will change direction with the rise of 
E(B) because Icc is positive in E(B):  As the prospects of victory increases, the common identity 
plays a greater role, which further attenuates the threat posture.  
  
Put differently, when the faction poised to win the conflict is about to win it, the faction would win 
greater dominance of the body politic by the acquiescence, rather than annihilation, of the 
opposing faction.  The need of reconciliation is a more impending demand if the losing faction 
happens to possess, for one reason or another, greater claim of national identity than the winning 
faction.  That is, the winning faction would want reach reconciliation with the losing faction if the 
losing faction is the true bearer of national identity.  So, as a result of common identity, the 
seemingly victorious faction would want to reach out to the other faction with a “brotherly” gesture 
of reconciliation, rather than totally defeating the much weaker faction. 
  
As in the previous model, the second derivative of T with respect to E(B) is positive for higher 
values of E(B) and negative for lower values.  This assumption allows us to define the maximum 
threat (T
max), i.e., civil war, and the minimum threat (T
 min), i.e., reconciliation: 
E(B) Æ ∞               T Æ Tmax 
E(B) Æ - ∞                  T Æ T min 
  
Figure 2 demonstrates the assumptions of the model.  Again, the x-axis denotes the endogenous 
variable, threat, while the y-axis denotes the independent variable.  According to the optimum 
threat curve (T), the agent takes these actions, 
Quarrel      when     T>0 
          Reconcile     when      T<0 
As E(B) rises, the threat posture rises correspondingly until E(B) reaches the critical value E(B)
uc.  
At E(B)
uc, expected cost (E(C)) and common identity (Icc) take positive values.  Both positive values 
discontinuously lower the level of T—i.e., push the T curve to the left.  The T curve switches 
direction as well, i.e., T declines with the rise of (EB), given the assumption that common identity, 
as a positive function of E(B), has a greater effect on T than E(B) does on T.   
 




Reconcile  Quarrel/Civil 
T
 
Figure 2: Threat in Quarrel-or-Reconcile Model 
  18  That is, when the faction under focus is about to reap high expected benefit from winning 
the civil war, it starts to worry about all-out victory.  First, the faction starts to worry about 
subsidizing the vanquished faction.  Second, the faction starts to worry about its legitimacy without 
the support of the vanquished faction.  For some range of E (B)>E (B)
uc, the optimum threat curve 
may continue to be positive, but at much attenuated level.  As E(B) rises, the optimum threat curve 
becomes negative, which prompts the enormously more powerful faction to make reconciliatory 
gestures towards the almost vanquished faction. 
 
5.4   Solving the Puzzle 
Does the proposed quarrel-or-reconcile model explain the lack of moral outrage of South Korea 
vis-à-vis North Korea?   
  
The announcement of North Korea that it has nuclear weapons must not have been a threat to the 
identity of South Korea.  It is probable that at least some South Koreans felt that the weapons were 
actually directed at the US’s identity—and not a threat to their own.  In fact, North Korea has used 
its potential possession of these weapons, which it tends to exaggerate, to extract economic aid 
from the US, Japan, and South Korea [Chang, 2006].  Further, we should not be surprised that 
some South Koreans, tacitly or overtly, even felt proud that North Korea, as misguided as it is in its 
puritan ideology, was able to flex muscles and display national identity vis-à-vis an entity 
(US/Japan) which does not share same identity.   
  
At best, North Korea’s announcement, as explained earlier, would mean a prolonged conventional 
civil war.  This would increase the cost of war and cost of victory for South Korea.  Given, as 
argued earlier, that South Korea would be the victor of the civil war, the prospect of such costs 
would dampen its threat posture.  And such costs, especially the cost of victory, would be 
staggering.  The difference between the standard of living of North Korea and South Korea is huge.  
And South Korea has witnessed the enormous cost incurred by West Germany in absorbing East 
Germany, where income differentials were substantially less than in the case of the two Koreas.  
So, South Korea do not want to take the thrat/provocative posture towards North Korea because, 
despite the benefits of war, it involves a huge cost.  Thus, for South Korea, reconciliation, in the 
form of subsidies and appeasement, is better than war and the absorption of North Korea. 
  
Further, if South Korea wins the battle through war, it would lose the chance of acquiring the 
acquiescence of the vanquished.  Given the imminent victory of South Korea, the issue of common 
identity attenuates the zeal of waging greater threats.  South Korea would gain more if North Korea 
accepted reconciliation.  This is especially so given that a foreign power, i.e., the US/Japan, is on 
the side of the winning faction.  This victory, if won by force, would be tainted.  After all, a true 
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of foreign powers.  It is clearly understood that foreign powers are always and ultimately driven by 
their own national interests and constituency.  This, in fact, also explains why the Iraqi forces, allied 
with the US, have tried on many occasions to reach out to the Sunni minority.  These Iraqi forces 
have announced on so many occasions clemency to the resistance fighters.  It is obvious that the 
ruling coalition in Iraq can crush the resistance.  But it wants to win the hearts-and-minds of the 
opposing faction—especially when the opposing faction is the true bearer of national identity 
defined by opposing vigorously the presence of foreign troops on national soil.  Likewise, South 
Korea would want, with the increase of expected benefit of civil war, to reach reconciliation with 
North Korea, who seems to be the true bearer of national identity. 
  
As shown in Figure 2, South Korea would act according to the threat function in the negative 
second quadrant:  Higher likelihood of winning entails greater incentive to reconcile.  Such 
reconciliation would not mean genuine power sharing.  Rather, as noted earlier, it involves offering 
the losing faction a face-saving measure touted usually as peace making.  South Korea is not 
interested in totally alienating a faction whose legitimacy it needs, on one hand, and whose welfare 
it wants to minimize in its calculation, on the other.  So, the incident in early 2005, where South 
Korea was reconciliatory upon learning of North Korea’s announcement of possession of nuclear 
weapons, is predicted by the proposed quarrel-or-reconcile model. 
 
6.    RESIST-OR-SUBMIT MODEL 
This model also involves two assumptions.  First, identity matters.  This sets this model apart from 
the fight-or-flight model.  Second, identity is not shared by the opposing camps—which sets it apart 
from the quarrel-or-reconcile model.  Consequently, the options facing the camp under focus are 
either resist or submit.   
  
To clarify, the term “resist” is used in the sense of “rebel”—with maybe one very minor difference.  
The term “rebel” is usually used when the agent under focus is fully under the control of the 
hegemonic power—as in the case of the American rebellion against colonial Britain.  In contrast, 
the term “resist” is usually employed when the agent under focus is being threatened by such a 
power. 
  
Similar to the fight-or-flight model, the resist-or-submit model involves the warring of two 
enemies—but with one major difference.  The enemies in the fight-or-flight model are involved in 
pure predator-prey dynamics of who-eats-who:  There is no obligatory commitment or property 
right in place.  In contrast, the enemies in the resist-or-submit model are implicitly or explicitly 
bound by property rights, i.e., the reciprocal recognition of the right of the other.  That is, the 
  20enemies have already reached an obligatory commitment concerning rights in order to avoid the 
suboptimal prisoners’ dilemma outcome.
7   
  
The obligatory commitment is at the origin of identity.  If one camp is attacked by the other, the 
injured camp does not only suffer from a lower welfare.  It also suffers from an “insult,” i.e., the 
negation of its identity.  The agreement it reached with the enemy camp has been violated, which 
amounts to ridicule.  The feeling of ridicule instigates, under particular conditions, moral outrage, 
as shown below, to defend one’s identity.  The defense of identity amounts to buttressing symbolic 
dimensions of utility [Khalil, 2000].  
 
6.1 A Simple Model 
The same assumptions listed in the fight-or-flight model still hold here—except for assumption g.  
Now, we can assume that the body politic of the agent under focus is heterogeneous, i.e., it can 
consist simultaneously of two frames of mind.  But let us first examine how it is made up of a single 
frame of mind, as expressed when a single representative agent offers threat (T), 
T = f [{E(B)}, {C│E(B)≥E(B)
lc}, {Ioc(E(B))│E(B)≤E(B)
lc}, {d(E(B))}], 
whereas Ioc is opposite categorical identity and is negative in E(B), contrary to IccE(B) in the earlier 
quarrel-or-reconcile model.  T is positive in Ioc, contrary again to T(Icc) in the earlier model. Also, as 




What differentiates this model from the earlier two is the dynamics arising from the countervailing 
forces of cost (C) and opposing categorical identity (Ioc).    
  
Concerning cost (C), similar to the fight-or-flight model, T is positive in C if E(B)≥E(B)
lc.  That is, the 
prospect of greater cost would bolster one’s resistance to attack if it is clear that the expected 
benefit is high enough.  Otherwise, T is negative in C—which would shift the curve discontinuously 
to the left, given that C is a constant.  That is, given the same cost, but falling prospects of winning 
below the critical level, the agent would feel fatigue, and may start wanting to submit.   
                                                  
7 Actually, the prisoners’ dilemma story already includes the property rights agreement (buttressed by the 
institution of trust) between the two prisoners.  So, the story is about temptation or weakness of will:  Should 
one actor betray his friend and violate the agreement?  This begs the question about the origin of property 
rights or obligatory commitment:    A better story of the origin of property rights is the Red Queen in Alice’s 
Adventures in Wonderland [Khalil, 1997a]. 
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The tendency to submit in the resist-or-submit model is analytically similar to the option of “flight” in 
the flight-or-flight model.  But there is a difference.  In the resist-or-submit model, the sense of 
fatigue, which may urge the agent to submit, involves both the lowering of welfare and bitterness 
that may turn into self-anger.  This is not evident in the fight-or-flight model which only involves the 
lowering of welfare.  The bitterness concerns the negation, for what seems to the losing camp an 
unfair reason, of categorical identity.  The bitterness is accompanied by ridicule, i.e., the lowering 
of self-integrity or symbolic utility [Khalil, 2000].  If the agent gives up out of fatigue, he must submit 
and become a colony or a client state of the hegemonic enemy, while harboring still what Timur 
Kuran [1995] calls “preference falsification.”  That is, the agent behaves submissively in public, but 
continues to uphold resistance preferences in private.  The phenomenon of “preference 
falsification” is afforded by the sense of unfairness.  This sense is possible only if there is a prior 
recognition of rights—which sets apart the resist-or-submit model from the fight-or-flight model. 
  
Concerning opposing categorical identity (Ioc), If E(B)≥E(B)
lc, Ioc would be very low and, for 
simplicity, is assumed to be zero.  First, the agent who is about to reap the huge benefit does not 
need to expend more resources in arousing nationalist feelings.  Second, and more importantly, 
the agent who is about to win does not want to raise the issue of identity, which may antagonize 
and galvanize the losing opponent by depriving him of the fig leaf to cover the submission.   
  
For instance, US president George Bush [1989-1993] expressed repeated restraints from 
celebrating the fall of the Berlin Wall in Autumn 1989 and German unification in Autumn 1990.   
Bush wanted, as he told reporters in 1999, to provide his opponent, Mikhail Gorbachev an easy 
exit from Eastern Europe, i.e., avoid galvanizing a backlash from Russian communists and 
nationalists [Williams, 1999].  However, there are other incidences when nationalism was used by 
aggressors about to win conflicts—such as Nazi Germany and militarist Japan in the 1930s.   
However, it is not clear if these aspiring powers considered themselves victors in the sense of the 
resist-or-submit model, given the strong alliance posed against them. 
  
On the other hand, as already insinuated, Ioc would be positive when E(B)≤E(B)
lc.  In fact, once 
E(B) ≤E(B)
lc, Ioc rises with the decline of E(B).  The further decline of E(B) acts as an incentive to 
agitate one’s identity, to prompt one to gain focus and determination, and to resist more fiercely 
what seems an unjust and unfair attack by the enemy.  Further, the identity effect is assumed to be 
greater than the welfare effect which urges the agent to submit.   
  For many outsiders who do not share the same identity, and for all economists informed 
exclusively by the forward-looking welfare calculation of the fight-or-flight model, such fierce 
resistance is a sign of irrationality, cult following, intense hatred, or emotions run amok.  However, 
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stronger group determination to resist.  This dynamic has acted as Achilles’ heel in many military 
campaigns of definitely superior powers vis-à-vis inferior forces. 
  
Given that T is positive in Ioc, and that Ioc gains force with the decline of E(B) below the critical level, 
the losing camp becomes galvanized by nationalism opposed to the winning camp.  That is, as the 
agent finds the prospect of expected benefit is ebbing, and is engulfed with fatigue and ready to 
quit, he is also becomes overwhelmed by the raging madness of how unjust is his situation.  Such 
rage definitely prompts a countervailing force of surrender/submission.   
  
In this low range of E(B), the agent operates with two frames of minds.  And if it is a multi-person 
organization, the agent splits into two factions:  The “moderate faction” would like to submit and, 
hence, might be able to salvage some of their possessions.  The “militant faction” would like to 
continue and resist.  These two factions characterize much of the politics of the Hebrews in the 8
th 
and 6
th centuries BC in their dealings with the hegemonic power of Assyria [Boardman, John, et al., 
1991].  It also characterizes much of the politics of the Arabs in the 20
th Century, of which 
Palestinian politics is the microcosm, in their dealings with the hegemonic power of the UK-France 
alliance after Word War I, succeeded by the US and its allies after World War II [Dawisha, 2003; 
Yaqub, 2004].   
  
As in the previous models, the second derivative of T with respect to E(B) is positive for higher 
values of E(B) as well as, when identity matters, lower values of E(B)—while negative for lower 
values when cost matters.  This assumption allows us to define the maximum threat (T
max), i.e., 
resistance, and the minimum threat (T
 min), i.e., submission: 
E(B) Æ ∞               T Æ Tmax 
E(B) Æ - ∞                T Æ T min 
  
Figure 3 demonstrates the assumptions of the model.  The x-axis denotes the endogenous 
variable, threat, while the y-axis denotes the independent variable.  According to the optimum 
threat curve (T), the agent takes these actions, 
Resist      when     T>0 
Submit     when      T<0 
 
As E(B) falls, threat posture correspondingly falls until E(B) reaches the critical value E(B)
lc. 
At E(B)
lc, the agent becomes in two frames of mind:  The moderate frame expresses the 
dominance of the welfare/fatigue effect over the identity effect—shown in the third quadrant.  The 
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Figure 3: Threat in Resist-or-Submit Model 
  246.2   Solving the Puzzle 
Does the proposed resist-or-submit model solve the moral outrage puzzle, i.e., the eruption of 
emotion of South Korea vis-à-vis Japan?   
  
In case of war, South Korea would not be the clear winner against Japan because the US would, 
most likely, choose neutrality.  As such, E(B) is below the critical level and, hence, identity is 
positive.  The announcement by Japan in early 2005 of sovereignty over the rocky islets must have 
galvanized the identity of South Korea into resistance.  For South Korea, the announcement is a 
violation of property rights [see Koo, 2005]. 
  
On the other hand, the model predicts that South Korea would have another frame of mind, viz., 
the submission to Japan’s demands.  So far, events have not supported this prediction.  However, 
this is a small event in a long sequence of events, which continue to develop.  If Japan presses its 
claims, and backs it with show of military might, the model predicts that South Korea would be split 
into factions, the moderate faction calling for submission to Japan and the militant faction calling for 
resistance to Japan. 
 
7.    CONCLUSION: LIMITS OF IDENTITY HYPOTHESIS 
Is the social science case, the identity hypothesis promoted by Akerlof/Sugden, a “just-so” story?  
Is the identity notion deus ex machina—i.e., introduced in an ad hoc manner in the utility function in 
order to account for special phenomena?  George Stigler and Gary Becker [1977] criticized the ad 
hoc  strategy of many social scientists, including economists, who arbitrarily change the utility 
function in order to account for some observed change in action.  According to the Stigler/Becker 
warning, this would amount to a “just-so” story or lack of “analytical equality”:  One should use the 
same utility function in order to explain action.  So, does the introduction of “identity” violate the 
criterion of “analytical equality”?   
  
This is not the case.  The same explanatory variable, identity, was used to explain both the moral 
outrage leveled at Japan and the lack of such outrage, to wit, reconciliation, leveled at North 
Korea. 
  
So, the social science case of identity is not a “just-so” story.  Nonetheless, it is problematic in 
another respect.  The social science case views identity as a given datum, as a deep norm that 
instructs and forms action in a way that is almost oblivious to incentives, i.e., cost/benefit 
calculation [Khalil, 2003].  The dualist view amounts to stating that the agent is made up of two 
selves: one is interested in welfare utility and the other in moral or symbolic utility [see Etzioni, 
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question:  How one can explain the origin of identity?  If one conceives identity to be derived from a 
source totally unrelated to interest (i.e., the dualist view), one would have only one option:  Namely, 
one would have to argue that identity is derived from norms posited by history.  That is, one would 
have to resort to the backward-looking approach—as if agents are programmed to behave that 
way irrespective of incentives [Khalil, 2003].   
  
However, in the greater stretch of history, identities are created and destroyed.  For instance, the 
warring nations of Europe are trying to forge a new identity with the emergence of the European 
Union.  Also, centuries earlier, the warring tribes of the Arabian Peninsula forged a new identity 
with the emergence of Islam.  Identity is not written in stone as suggested by the social science 
case.  The idea that identity evolves presents limits to the proposed quarrel-or-reconcile model as 
well as to the resist-or-submit model. 
  
The challenge is to examine the origin of identity.  This is not an easy question [Khalil, 2006a].  To 
endogenize identity, one needs to take a closer look at how identities are formed in relation to 
interest.  A good starting point is to examine how symbolic products—such as admiration 
(prestige), respect, and self-integrity [see Khalil, 1996, 2000]—are related to interest.  Symbolic 
products are not quite reducible to interest.  Nonetheless, they are organically connected to 
interest—otherwise, how can we endogenize identity.  But to show this, one needs another forum. 
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